We consider a voting model over the payroll tax rate in a Pay-As-You-Go pension system. Individuals are differentiated according to their age and productivity. They choose the level of their savings and their retirement age. The pension system can be neutral (incentives to continue working are not affected by the pension system), or biased. We show that a biased pension system, inducing early retirement, may allow to achieve a higher welfare for the majority of the voters than a neutral system.
Introduction
Over the last forty years, old people labor force participation has been dramatically decreasing in almost all industrialized countries. Whereas participation rates for men aged 60 to 64 were above 70% in the early 60s, they had fallen to 57% in Sweden and to below 20% in Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands by the mid 90s. 1 At the same time, people are living longer and longer. In the European Union, life expectancy at age 65 has increased by more than one year per decade since 1950. This puts an enormous pressure on the financial viability of Pay-AsYou-Go (PAYG) pension systems and the situation will become even more problematic when the "baby boomers" will come to retirement. Gruber and Wise (1997) attribute this large decline in the labor force participation to the incentives created by social security systems. Two features of social security plans have an important effect on labor force participation incentives. The first is the early retirement provision.
In the beginning of the 70s, most countries introduced the possibility for the workers to retire at an age lower than the "normal" retirement age. The second feature is the incentive to continue working, once the early retirement age has been attained. An individual who contemplates the decision of working one additional year is loosing the pension benefit for that year. This constitutes an implicit tax on work when the pension benefit formula is not adjusted "actuarially", in the sense that later benefits do not offset completely this loss. Moreover, this individual must pay social security taxes and these tax payments make retirement more attractive.
From a macroeconomic perspective, these provisions have been adopted, following a slow down in the economic activity, to induce older workers to leave the labor force or to accomodate a preexisting departure (retirement of previously unemployed).
We argue in this paper that introducing taxes on elderly work may be a way to redistribute income from late workers to early retirees. We construct a political economy model that captures this idea. The (PAYG) pension system can be neutral or biased. In the first case, incentives to continue working are not affected by the introduction of the pension system. When working one year more, an individual earns the same income as in the pure market economy, namely his wage level (which his equal to his productivity). In a biased system, caracterized by a parameter θ, his work is taxed and he is induced to retire earlier. 2 Pension benefits are flat 1 A notable exception is Japan. 2 A neutral system is such that θ = 0. As we assume no income effect on labor supply decisions, the retirement age is the same whether there is no pension system or a neutral one.
while contributions are proportional to labor income. Consequently, the pension system operates some income redistribution from the rich workers towards the poor. Individuals choose freely the age at which they retire. In such a setting, the introduction of a bias in the pension system unambiguously leads individuals to retire earlier. Consumption becoming more expensive with respect to leisure, individuals choose to consume more leisure and, acordingly, work less. We then turn to the majority voting determination of the payroll tax rate. Preferences of the young are single-crossing if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than one. When θ is not too large, preferences of the old are increasing with the tax rate. This guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.
Our main analytical findings are the following. First, when relative risk aversion is lower than one, the majority voting equilibrium tax rate increases if one introduces a small bias in the pension system. This is because the introduction of a bias creates some redistribution from the late workers towards the early retirees and the median voter benefits from this redistribution.
Old age consumption becomes cheaper relatively to consumption when young and the median voter raises his optimal tax rate when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than 1 (which implies that the substitution effect dominates the income effect). Second, the welfare of all the young individuals with a productivity less than the median voter and the old with income less than average increases following the introduction of a small bias. The redistribution operated in the biased system benefits all the individuals with income below the mean. However, it has also an impact on the tax rate chosen by the median voter. Because the preferred tax rate of the median voter increases following the introduction of the bias, every young with a productivity less than the median voter -who want a higher tax rate than the democratically chosen one -also benefit from this second, indirect, effect.
In order to get more insights on the welfare effects of the introduction of a bias, we rely on numerical simulations. In all the simulations performed, more than half of the total population favor a slight increase in the bias, when the pension system is initially neutral. However, (utilitarian) social welfare may increase or decrease following the introduction of such a bias. Even though the utility levels of the poorer half of the population increases, the loss is so large for the richer individuals that it yields a drop in social welfare.
Related literature
The effect of the introduction of a pension system on the retirement decision has been studied by Sheshinski (1978) and Crawford and Lilien (1981) . These latter argue that introducing a pension system actuarially fair (total benefits are equal to total contributions) does not affect the retirement decision when there are no borrowing contraints and savings yield a zero interest rate. In this case, private savings are simply replaced by public pensions. Introducing borrowing constraints may cause individuals to retire earlier but not later. When the level of public pension contributions are high, it results in forced savings and individuals use these forced savings to purchase additional leisure (which is a normal good). However, if pension benefits cannot be collected before a given age, individuals wishing to retire before this legal retirement age may want to delay retirement in order to smooth consumption before and after retirement. The introduction of a pension system which is not marginally fair leads to an increase of the price of leisure with respect to consumption. 3 If the substitution effect dominates the income effect, it induces people to retire earlier. 4 To our knowledge, only two papers deal with the retirement decision in a political economy environment. Lacomba and Lagos (1999) study the problem of the vote directly on the (mandatory) retirement age. More closely related to our study, Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2000) develop a model in which the vote takes place simultaneously on the payroll tax rate and on the decision to introduce or not an early retirement provision. They show that the early retirement provision may be sustained at equilibrium by a coalition of the poor workers, who want to retire early, and old people with incomplete earnings history, who would receive no pension without this provision. This analysis and our can be considered as complementary. Indeed, we do not investigate the issue of introducing an early retirement age. We determine to what extent the the design of the pension benefit formula, and its induced effect on retirement behaviour, affect the majority voting tax rate and ultimately the voters' welfare.
The model
Individuals live for two periods and they are differentiated according to their wage level per unit of time (productivity). The distribution of productivities has support [w − , w + ], density function 3 Departures from actuarial fairness can be of three types. First, the pension system may redistribute from some individuals to others, for example from rich to poor individuals. Second, the aggregate level of benefits may outweigh the aggregate level of contributions, which is typically the case in a PAYG system. Third, the sytem may not be marginally fair, in the sense that the pension received when working one more year does not fully reflect the fact that benefits are received on a shorter period and that total contributions made into the system are greater. 4 This takes an extreme form in our model where income effects are assumed away.
f (.), and cumulative distribution function F (.). We assume that the median productivity, w m , is lower than the mean, w. The intertemporal utility function is:
where c is the first period consumption and x is the second period consumption. In the following, we denote d = x − γz 2 /2; β is a factor of time preference, which is, by assumption, equal to 1/ (1 + r) and r is the interest rate. First and second periods are of equal length, normalized to 1. labor supply is assumed to be inelastic in the first period. In the second period, individuals decide which fraction of time, denoted by z ∈ [0, 1], they spend working. This variable is interpreted as the retirement age. The disutility of work, z 2 /2, is expressed in monetary terms and γ represents the intensity of the disutility of work. With this particular form of the labor disutility function, we get rid of any income effect: labor supply decisions only depend on the relative price of labor and consumption.
First and second period consumptions for an individual with productivity w are respectively
given by:
where τ ∈ [0, 1] is the payroll tax rate and s ≥ 0 is the amount of savings; P corresponds to the total pension received and does not depend on z. The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the bias of the pension system. Indeed, we define a neutral system as a system that does not distort individual decisions concerning retirement age. In other words, such a system does not modify the relative price of labor and consumption, compared to the situation with no pension scheme. In a neutral system, the marginal benefit of working one more year is then w. This is the case in our setting when θ = 0. When θ > 0, the relative price of labor and consumption becomes w (1 − θτ ). Consumption is therefore more expensive and individuals are induced to retire earlier. 5 Note that P does not depend on w. This means that the pension system considered operates income redistribution across individuals of the same generation. Everyone contributes for an amount proportional to his labor income but the benefit received does not vary across individuals.
5 A pension system might also induce people to retire earlier when the amount of pension benefit forgone if working one more year is not compensated by a corresponding increase in the pension level. This effect would be taken into account in our model if P was decreasing with z.
Individual savings and retirement decisions
In this section, we characterize the optimal savings and retirement decisions of old and young individuals, for given τ , P and θ. We denote (z y , s y ) the optimal decisions of young individuals, where z y is the retirement age and s y is the amount of savings. Decisions concerning savings have been made in the past for old people. Their only decision is to choose when to retire. The optimal retirement decision of an old individual is denoted z o .
The old
The program of old individuals is the following:
The first-order condition for an interior value of z is:
This leads to
In order to ensure that z o ≤ 1 for everyone, we assume γ ≥ w + . All the individuals choose to work in the second period (except when θτ = 1). The higher the productivity of an individual, the later he retires: consumption being cheaper for more productive individuals, they choose to work and consume more, provided of course that there is no income effect. On the other hand, increasing the bias of the system or the payroll tax rate contributes to increase the price of consumption with respect to labor and consequently induces people to retire earlier. It should be noted that with no distortions, z o is equal to w/γ and corresponds to the first best level.
Finally, a higher desutility of work yields lower retirement ages.
The young
The program of young individuals is the following:
The choice of z is the same as for old individuals and we have:
This yields
Recalling that β (1 + r) = 1, the first order condition for an interior solution of s is:
Individuals want to equalize first and second period consumptions (net of the desutility of labor).
For individuals choosing an interior solution, we obtain:
Budget constraint
A feasible pension scheme must satisfy the government budget contraint:
where N y and N o are respectively the numbers of young and old individuals, n is the rate of population growth, y = wz and y =
The total pension received by a given individual is the sum of tax revenues on first and second period incomes. The tax base in the first period, (1 + n) w, is fixed whereas it depends on θτ in the second period. When the level of taxation is increased, individuals choose to retire earlier and as a consequence, there is less income to tax. Put differently, taxation only gives rise to distortions on second period income. Differentiating (2), we have:
and
The budget curve is concave, always above the line τ (1 + n) w and P is equal to τ (1 + n) w when τ = 0 and θτ = 1. This is represented on the picture below. 
Preferred tax rates
Let define
which represent the utility levels attained by type w individuals, young or old, for a given tax rate τ . Preferred tax rates for young and old individuals, denoted respectively τ y and τ o , are obtained by solving the following programs:
We prove in appendix 1 the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (i) Preferred tax rates of young individuals are decreasing with productivity if the coefficient of relative risk aversion, R r (x) = −xu (x) /u (x), is lower than 1.
(ii) If lim The intuition for the first result is the following. Consider first the case in which individuals do not work in the second period. Pension benefits being flat with respect to income, the relative price of second and first periods consumptions decreases with productivity. Put differently, it costs less (in terms of first period consumption) to buy one unit of second period consumption for a low productivity individual than for a high one. By the susbstitution effect, low productivity individuals are induced to buy less first period consumption. For utility functions such that R r (.) < 1, the substitution effect dominates and low productivity individuals want tax rates larger than high productivity individuals. Note that when R r (.) = 1 (logarithmic utility function), income and substitution effects neutralize and preferred tax rates are constant with respect to productivity. Now, we must take into account two additional effects when individuals work in the second period. 6 First, with additional labor income in the second period, the substitution effect dominates, even with a logarithmic utility function. Second, labor income in the second period increases with productivity. This income effect induces more productive individuals to raise their first period consumption by reducing their preferred tax rate. These two effects reinforce the first one. As a consequence, preferred tax rates are decreasing with productivity.
The first part of point (ii) is obvious. If an individual chooses a tax rate equal to 1, he consumes nothing in the first period. When the marginal utility of consumption tends to infinity, this individual has an incentive to reduce marginally the tax rate. To illustrate the second part, 6 In such a case, the relative price of second and first periods consumptions is still decreasing with productivity.
let us write the first-order derivative of a young individual life cycle utility at the point τ = 0 (savings being optimally chosen):
where we have used the fact that savings are positive when τ = 0 which implies that u (c) = u (d). A first observation is that, in a neutral system (θ = 0), individuals choose a positive tax rate if and only if w ≤ βw (1 + n) = w (1 + n) / (1 + r). Indeed, in such a system there is no redistribution of second period incomes. Individuals favoring a positive tax rate are those for whom the rate of return of the PAYG system, (1 + n) w/w is higher than the rate of return of private savings, 1 + r. Moreover, these individuals do not want to save at their optimal tax rate. Now, if one introduces a bias in the system, second period incomes are redistributed from individuals with a productivity level higher than E (w 2 ) towards individuals with a lower productivity. Therefore, individuals such that w ≤ w (1 + n) / (1 + r) still want a positive tax rate but some individuals with a higher productivity also do. It should be noted that contrarily to the neutral case, it may be the case that some individuals make savings when their optimal tax rate is implemented. In this model, the payroll tax rate serves two objectives: intertemporal consumption smoothing and (second period) income redistribution. An individual may then have some incentive to reduce his optimal tax rate with respect to the neutral case in order to limit tax distortions and to benefit from an increased redistribution. In a such a case, savings might constitute a useful instrument to transfer resources between first and second periods.
The last point of the proposition says that old individuals choose corner solutions for the tax rates. Consider the first-order derivative with respect to the tax rate of the old objective function (given in (6)):
In a neutral system (and by continuity in a slightly biased system), every old has an increasing objective function and chooses the maximal possible tax rate, τ = 1. When θ is increased, one can see that by evaluating the above expression at τ = 0 that old people with productivity w 2 < E w 2 + (1 + n) wγ/θ want a positive tax rate. We prove in the appendix that they in fact most prefer τ = 1. Starting from τ = 0, old individuals with a higher productivity dislikes a marginal increase in the tax rate. However this does not mean that their optimal tax rate is 0. Indeed, we show that their objective function may be convex. To see this, evaluate the above expression at τ = 1 when θ = 1: it is positive. When θ = 1 and τ approaches 1, everyone stops working and the old rich do not suffer anymore from the redistribution towards the poor one. On the other hand, their pension increases with the tax rate. They thus favor a marginal increase in the tax rate.
Voting equilibrium
We now want to determine the payroll tax rate chosen in a majority vote, namely the Condorcet winner. Conditions ensuring the existence of an equilibrium are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than one and θ is small enough, a voting equilibrium on τ exists.
Proof. We proved in appendix 1 that, for utility functions such that R r (.) ≤ 1, preferences of the young over tax rates satisfy the single-crossing condition established by Gans and Smart (1996) . This means that we can order young individuals and alternatives in such a way that if an individual prefers the higher of two alternatives, all the individuals ranked to the right of this individual display the same preference. This is not however sufficient to guarantee the existence of a Condorcet winner. The reason is that the preferences of the old may be convex, as argued in the last paragraph of the previous section. In these circumstances, it is possible that an old individual favors a slight decrease in the tax rate even though his preferred tax rate is 1. To overcome this difficulty, we restrict our attention to cases where the utility of the old is monotonically increasing with the tax rate. This is true when the bias parameter, θ, is small enough, as argued in the last paragraph of the last section.
The pivotal voter, who is a young individual, is then implicitly determined by the following condition:
The pivotal voter is such that half of the total population (the old and the young with a lower productivity) want a higher tax rate and the other half (the young with a higher productivity) want a lower tax rate. The majority voting equilibrium, τ mv , is then τ y (w piv ). If n = r, the majority voting tax rate is positive. Indeed, we know that if n = r, preferred tax rates are positive for all the individuals with a productivity below the mean. The median productivity being lower than the mean, more than half of the young population favor a positive tax rate.
This implies that the pivotal voter chooses a positive tax rate.
3 Comparisons between neutral and biased systems
Equilibrium tax rates
In this section, we want to determine how the majority voting tax rate vary when one introduces a small bias in the pension system. We obtain the following result, proved in appendix 2.
Proposition 3 Starting from a neutral system and considering a small increase in θ, the majority voting tax rate increases if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than 1.
When θ stays close to 0, the "identity" of the pivotal voter does not change. It is given by (7) . Therefore, the only effect of increasing θ is to change the preferred tax rate of the pivotal voter. The increase in θ results in a redistributive effect that benefit people such that y < y (⇔ w 2 < E w 2 ), which is the case of the pivotal voter. Second period consumption becomes cheaper for him with respect to first period consumption. When the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than 1, the substitution effect dominates the income effect and he chooses a higher tax rate in order to consume more in the second period.
Welfare
The next proposition, proved in appendix 3, examines the welfare consequences of introducing a small bias in the system.
Proposition 4
Starting from a neutral system and following a small increase in θ, the welfare of the young individuals to the "left" of the pivotal voter and the old individuals such that w 2 < E w 2 increases if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than 1.
Increasing θ has two consequences. First, it induces some redistribution from people with income above the mean towards people with income below the mean. Second, it yields a higher voting tax rate. All the people with productivity w 2 < E w 2 benefit from the redistributive effect. On the other hand, every old individual benefits from an increase of the tax rate. However, only young individuals to the left of the pivotal voter -that is with a lower productivitywant a tax rate higher than the median voter. For old people with income above the mean and young people to the right of the median voter and with income below the mean, the two effects are conflicting and we cannot say which one dominates. 7 In the next section, we resort to numerical simulations in order to get more insights.
Numerical simulations
In these simulations, productivities are distributed on [1, 100] and γ = 100. We consider two possible distributions: a distribution skewed to the right with w m = 17.59 < w = 22.33 < E (w 2 ) = 26.82 and a uniform distribution function with w m = w = 50.5 < E (w 2 ) = 58.03.
The utility function is isoelastic:
, where ε is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In each simulation, we have calculated individuals welfare for each value of θ. We report in the tables below the productivity of the young individuals indifferent between θ = 0 and θ = 0.01 as well as (between brackets) the proportion of the young individuals prefering the higher of these two values. The same analysis is conducted for old individuals. The third column then indicates the proportion of the total population favoring θ = 0.01 over θ = 0. In the last column, a sign + (resp. −) indicates that the utilitarian social welfare increases (resp. decreases) when moving from θ = 0 to θ = 0.01. 8 We present results in the cases r = n = 1 and ε = 0.2, 0.5 and are large in number and are the poorest ones. We performed other simulations with different 7 Of course, young individuals with income above the mean suffer from the two effects. 8 Utilitarian social welfare is the sum of life-cyle utility levels. Consequently, it only takes into account the welfare of the young.
values of r and n and the results are not qualitatively modified. We also allowed for a value of ε larger than 1 (namely 2). Once again, the results are similar. The reader should however keep in mind that the existence of a voting equilibrium on τ is not guaranteed in such a case. In the case of a uniform distribution, the political support for an increase in θ is much lower than in the previous case. As a consequence, social welfare may decrease following the introduction of a small bias in the pension system. Even though the poorest half of the population benefits from such a policy, the loss for the other part of the population is so important that it dominates and leads to a drop in social welfare.
Another interesting insight of the numerical simulations -which does not appear in the above table -is that the poorest individuals may oppose a large increase in θ. This is so because the majority voting tax rate decreases in such a case and this negative effect (the poor want high tax rates) may then dominates the positive redistributive effect.
Conclusion
[to be completed] to conclude that dP/dτ | w=w > dP/dτ | w=w . We then turn to the case where w saves and w does not save. Define
We have
If the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than 1, this expression is positive. Therefore, w A (w ) < w A (w ) < w . Comparing (8) and (9), we obtain that dP/dτ | w=w > dP/dτ | w=w .
To sum up, we have proved that the slope of the indifference curves is always increasing with productivity when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than 1. This leads to our conclusion that preferred tax rates are decreasing with productivity.
(ii) Differentiating (5) with respect to τ and using (3), we have
+β (1 + n) w + θ − 2θ We argue now that s y > 0 when τ = 0. From (1),
(2 + r) = w − w 2 2γ (2 + r) > 0 ⇔ w < 2γ.
Because γ ≥ w + , the condition w < 2γ is satisfied for any w. If w < w (1 + n) / (1 + r) then w < w. This implies that w 2 < w 2 < E w 2 , by Jensen's inequality. Following the discussion above, this indifference curve is always below the budget curve. Therefore, individuals with productivity w s have a preferred tax rate equal to 1. Observing that the slope of indifference curves is increasing with productivity, all individuals with a productivity less than w s want also a tax rate equal to 1. Individuals with a higher productivity do not choose an interior solution for τ . Indeed, their indifference curves being "more" concave than the budget curve, a point of tangency between an indifference curve and the budget curve corresponds to a minimizing tax rate. The individuals indifferent between τ = 0 and τ = 1 are such that
⇔ u s (1 + r) + P (0) + w o 2 2γ = u s (1 + r) + P (1) +
Note that this equation does not always have a solution. In particular, when θ = 0, every old individual most prefer a tax rate equal to 1. Observe also that the indifferent old individual has a productivity level higher than w. Finally, dw o 2 /dθ < 0.
B Proof of proposition 2
The majority voting tax rate, when positive, is determined by the following first-order condition:
−wu (c) + β (1 + n) w + θ − 2θ 
